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 The EU Global Strategy is a broad and ambitious document in terms of its 
geographic scope and thematic priorities.  However, the EU cannot devote equal 
attention to all aspects of the EUGS, so there is still scope for more clarity regarding 
the EU's core strategic aims.  This article argues that in addition to fostering internal 
cohesion, the EU's strategic priority must involve stabilising its own neighbourhood.  
This task has challenged the EU for decades because of an inherent credibility deficit 
regarding the EU's own capabilities, yet the EUGS does not diagnose and remedy this 
problem as effectively as it could have.  Therefore much more work will need to be 
done in terms of reforming EU institutions and developing common capabilities if the 
EU hopes to achieve its central internal and external security goals as outlined in the 
EUGS and related policy statements. 
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 Since the early 1970s, the European integration process has involved periodic 
strategising about the priorities for external policy cooperation.  These efforts, 
beginning with the Document on the European Identity (December 1973), are 
remarkably consistent in terms of core thematic goals (democracy, human rights, 
peace/security, multilateralism, the UN system, and the rule of law) and geographic 
priorities (Europe's eastern flank and the Middle East/North Africa, or MENA, 
including the Mediterranean).  In recent years these priorities have been reflected in 
more specific strategies, whether involving 'functional' goals, such as the 2003 
European Security Strategy (ESSi), the 2008 review of the ESS,ii the 2013 EU Cyber-
security Strategy (CSS), and the 2014 Maritime Security Strategy (MSS), or 
geographic/regional objectives, such as various EU Common Strategies,iii the 2007 
Joint Africa-EU Strategy and Central Asian Strategy, the 2011 Sahel Strategy, and the 
2015 review of the European Neighbourhood Policy (among others).  Finally, the EU 
has also managed, since 2003, to deploy its own military or hard power resources 
along with its traditional civilian or soft power resources such as diplomacy, trade, 
and development/humanitarian aid.  However, while this track record may appear 
impressive, the EU has fallen short in terms of implementing many of its external 
strategic goals, a tendency still often summarised in terms of a 'capability-
expectations gap'.iv 
 This article argues that such a gap is likely to persist in light of the latest effort 
along these lines: the EU Global Strategy (hereafter 'EUGS'v).  One problem is that 
the EUGS offers a very limited diagnosis of the EU's inherent shortcomings in terms 
of defining and achieving its strategic goals, especially considering the inadequate 
impact of the last major effort to reform the EU's institutional machinery (the 2009 
Lisbon Treaty).  The fact that the EUGS was not revised at all to take into account the 
 2 
consequences of Britain's vote to leave the EU lends additional support to this 
assessment.  A second problem involves the EU's likely credibility in pursuing its 
core strategic aims, which depends upon not just an accounting of the EU's currently 
available soft and hard power resources, but also a realistic evaluation of the EU's 
recent track record in deploying those resources to manage many of the problems 
stressed in the EUGS.  Thus, as the EU itself asserts that 'A dose of nuanced realism 
is required' about what the EU can achieve,vi the rest of this article will examine these 
two problems in order to assess the extent to which the EU is likely to implement 
most of the central ambitions of the EUGS.  It draws upon several recent studies 
conducted by the author and others regarding the EU's efforts as an international 
security actor, particularly since the advent of the Lisbon Treaty. 
 As space considerations prevent a detailed examination of the entire EUGS, 
my argument is subject to three important caveats.  First, as defence is covered 
elsewhere,vii I shall focus primarily on security.  This focus is also justified, I believe, 
because neither the EUGS nor the EU's track record on defence suggest that the EU 
will ever play a strategically important role in this realm, relative to NATO (as the 
EUGS affirms) and individual EU member states, which are still split on defence 
policyviii despite some recent suggestions of greater defence cooperation in the 
aftermath of Brexit.  Second, and following from the previous point, the EU is not 
likely to become a very credible global actor in areas outside of 
economic/trade/regulatory affairs.  This is true especially regarding major challenges 
or adversaries like China as well as key partners/competitors like the US and India.ix  
Thanks in part to its extremely limited capacity for military power projection,x the EU 
will play only a supporting role at best beyond Europe and its near abroad, and mainly 
when the US and the EU can agree on strategic priorities (such as overseeing Iran's 
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nuclear programme).  Third, I believe the EU's strategic priority must be to preserve 
its internal unity (which includes the EUGS goals of 'security' and 'prosperity') and 
stabilise its border regions.xi  These problems are directly linked, and this dual 
challenge, which should be the main concern of the EUGS, is also the central concern 
of this article.  Therefore I will focus primarily on where the EUGS matters the most: 
security in the EU's 'neighbourhood.'  In other words, to what extent can the EU make 
credible commitments to protect and advance its core strategic interests in this realm, 
as outlined in the EUGS? 
 
I. The EUGS: An overview 
 The EUGS is an impressive achievement; it is also an ambitious document, 
not least because it covers not just EU security/defence policy but foreign policy more 
generally.  In fact, at around 15,000 words, the EUGS is nearly four times as long as 
the 2003 ESS (just over 4,000 words).  The 2003 ESS mainly identified five 'key 
threats' to the EU: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 
organised crime, regional conflict, and state failure.  In 2008, a review process added 
two new problems - energy security and climate change - while also mentioning 
cyber-security.xii  Taken together, these documents list eight specific threats that could 
be addressed by various EU policy tools; some of these problems are discussed in 
more detail in the 2013 CSS and the 2014 MSS, among other statements. 
 Conversely, the EUGS broadens EU strategic thinking in several ways, first of 
all by noting some general values/interests/principles to guide EU action.xiii  However, 
most of these ideas have appeared in previous documents and/or EU treaties as noted 
above.  The real core of the EUGS, then, involves five strategic priorities as follows: 
 * Security and defence (including a deterrence capability) 
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 * Enhancing 'state and societal resilience to our East and South' 
 * An 'integrated approach' to conflicts and crises 
 * Promoting 'cooperative regional orders' 
 * Enhancing 'global governance for the 21st century'xiv 
 I shall return to these priorities below; for the moment it should be noted that 
despite the differences in approach noted above between the ESS and the EUGS 
(especially the new focus on 'resilience' relative to democracy and human rights), 
there is one central idea that links them both: the ESS mentions the need to develop a 
European strategic culture 'that fosters early, rapid, and where necessary, robust 
intervention,'xv while the EUGS mentions the goals of strategic autonomy and 
responsiveness.xvi  In other words, 'EU strategy' is not just about taking action; it is 
about the EU's (potential) freedom to choose among various courses of action, 
particularly during a crisis, rather than have difficult decisions forced upon it.  This 
also involves being proactive rather than reactive, and then being effective and 
credible when EU action is taken; these goals have eluded the EU in many ways. 
 To help address this problem, the EU produced a shorter document, the EUGS 
Review, exactly one year prior to the release of the EUGS, in June 2015.xvii  This 
analysis, which solicited input from various specialists, summarised the EU's major 
capabilities that could be used to implement the EUGS: the Common Foreign 
Security Policy (CFSP), the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), 
development/humanitarian aid, trade policy, sanctions, the Energy Security Strategy, 
a revised European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), and enlargement (among 
others).xviii  In addition, the EUGS Review also gave a brief diagnosis of areas where 
the EU had fallen short in its foreign/security/defence policy.  These include: 
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 * A lack of policy direction (particularly with the CFSP/CSDP and with the 
EU's 'strategic partnerships');  
 * A lack of flexibility (for example, development/humanitarian aid and 
counter-terrorism);  
 * A lack of EU 'leverage' considering the EU's trade power and the limited 
impact of the ENP;  
 * The 'coordination problem', which involves a range of dimensions in order 
to have 'multiple voices' speaking in unison for the EU rather than a 'single voice'; and 
 * The 'capability problem', which mentions issues such as migration and 
various difficulties regarding CSDP deployments. 
 This diagnosis is essentially correct, and has been confirmed by other EU 
bodiesxix and external reviews,xx yet it still falls short in terms of informing what 
appeared later in the EUGS regarding how to implement the new strategy.  Overall, 
then, the EUGS is very heavy on generalities and very light on communicating a real 
sense of urgency about priorities and, especially, leadership by one or more EU 
member states.xxi  In fact, EU member states themselves can be a major impediment 
to implementation, yet the EUGS does not address this problem, while EU member 
states are not willing to delegate more authority over foreign/security policy to EU 
institutions.  There is also little political will across the EU for another major reform 
like the ill-fated Constitutional Treaty.  As the EUGS reaffirms 'peer pressure' to 
maintain cohesion in an intergovernmental system, rather than punishing defections 
with fines or court rulings, the EU will continue to be hobbled by lowest-common-
denominator decisions, or worse - stalemate/paralysis - when attempting really 
difficult challenges, such as foreign peacekeeping operations, counter-terror actions, 
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refugee crises, or responses to military coups, civil wars, or violations of territorial 
sovereignty outside the EU. 
 For example, when France specifically invoked the EU's mutual assistance 
clause in response to the November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris,xxii only the UK 
deployed military force against Islamic State while a few other EU member states 
(Belgium, Germany, and Sweden) offered limited military support.  Most other EU 
member states, however, failed to offer much 'mutual assistance' (and the CSDP was 
not used at all).xxiii  The EUGS does not even mention these attacks or the EU's 
responses, or whether an attack on EU buildings/personnel (involving terrorists or 
otherwise) constitutes an attack against the EU itself; this is a major omission 
considering how many times 'terrorism' is mentioned in the document (32) and 
considering the March 2016 terrorist attacks in Brussels, the capital of 'Europe.'  
Similarly, how should the EU deal with member states that commit resources in 
principle to joint actions but then pull out their forces early or refuse to deploy them 
at all?  Or member states that launch unilateral actions without advance consultation 
with their EU partners?  As a 'common' foreign/security policy does not mean a 
'single' policy, the EU may have to learn to live with incoherence, and thus limited 
credibility in world politics, if it can't find an effective way to deal with these 
problems.  This challenge, among others, is most evident regarding the EU's track 
record of managing its single most important external challenge: stabilising its own 
neighbourhood. 
 
II. Stabilising the neighbourhood: The EU's strategic priority 
 As the EUGS is full of values, principles, interests, priorities, capabilities, 
policy tools, and other elements, all of which range in geographic scope around the 
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globe, it is very easy to lose sight of one simple, yet critical, fact: the EU cannot 
possibly do all of this, equally effectively, at the same time.  In other words, a bigger 
global strategy does not necessarily mean a better (i.e., more effective and credible) 
global strategy, and the EU undoubtedly will fail to achieve many of the goals in the 
EUGS simply because of limited attention and resources.  In addition, much of what 
is new in the EUGS is really about style rather than substance, so we can expect 
'business as usual' regarding most of what the EU does in world politics. 
 To be sure, many of the smaller problems cited in the EUGS are well within 
the EU's scope of capabilities and have been (or are now) being addressed with 
increased funding, new institutional mechanisms, and greater coordination among EU 
member states; these efforts include the European Counter-Terrorism Centre, a Civil 
Protection Mechanism, a European Medical Corps, and pending European Border 
Service/Coast Guard.  These are still focused largely on the eight security threats 
noted above; the EUGS also singles out three in particular (terrorism, cyber-security, 
and energy security).  These kinds of problems also might be mitigated if the EU 
manages to work, in the longer term with mostly diplomatic/economic capabilities, 
towards more 'cooperative regional orders' and enhanced 'global governance in the 
21st century', two of the five priorities noted above.xxiv 
 The EU's central external strategic problem today, however, can be 
summarised in terms of 'enhancing state and societal resilience to the East and South', 
plus an 'integrated approach' to conflicts and crises.xxv  If these can be combined into a 
single strategic focus - building resilience in the EU's neighbourhood to deter or 
manage crises/conflicts - then this in my view is the most important, but also the most 
incoherent, part of the entire EUGS, not least because the document does not clearly 
define 'resilience,' a catchword now used by many other global actors as well as 
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academics.xxvi  The EU's approach to resilience also stresses 'reform' even though 
resilience usually refers to an ability to 'recover' (which may not require 'reform'); this 
focus also can be criticised for accepting severe problems as a given rather than 
attempting to diagnose their root causes and then offering effective, sustainable 
solutions.  Beyond those important problems, the key point is that it is the EU's failure 
to manage its neighbourhood over the past decade or more that has led directly to 
many of Europe's current difficulties regarding terrorism, migrants/refugees, 
organised crime, energy security, hybrid threats, and so on.  Finally, it also seems 
clear that if the EU cannot effectively build resilience, stability, and cooperation with 
its own close neighbours, its internal legitimacy and its credibility as a strategic actor 
elsewhere could be undermined. 
 Yet the EUGS addresses this challenge somewhat misleadingly by first noting 
a 'credible enlargement policy' as a key policy tool, which simply is not credible at all 
for MENA states as they are not eligible.  Although the power of accession might 
work in time in the western Balkans, it is still somewhat naive in light of the more 
general 'enlargement fatigue' already felt across the EU, as well as recent events in 
Ukraine and Turkey, both of which could join the EU in principle but are not likely to 
in reality, at least for the foreseeable future.  Similarly, the discussion of the 'power of 
attraction' to build resilience in other EU 'neighbours' (i.e., those confined to the ENP) 
is extremely optimistic,xxvii and perhaps even unrealistic, considering the instability in 
most of the 16 original ENP partners.xxviii  In fact, out of these 16 partners, only 
Tunisia and Georgia are mentioned in the EUGS as (possible) 'success stories,' which 
clearly indicates that the ENP approach has been a dismal failure despite years of EU 
activity under this framework,xxix which was specifically created to cope with 
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instability in the east and south in light of the 2004 EU enlargement and was modelled 
largely on the EU's own accession process.xxx 
 Beyond the enlargement/ENP domains, a sub-section here also discusses a 
range of goals to promote resilience in 'surrounding regions.'xxxi  These goals include 
reforms to human rights, the security sector, the rule of law, cyber-security, 
sustainable development, education, health, energy, environment, civil society, and so 
on; basically a list of all normal state capacities.xxxii  Between the lack of clarity 
regarding credible EU capabilities, and the long list of goals framed (but not clearly 
prioritised) under the heading of 'resilience', this section is, quite frankly, strategically 
incoherent.  Most importantly, it is still not clear how the EU will face the ongoing 
challenge of having to choose between supporting autocratic regimes (to promote 
stability or 'resilience') or supporting EU liberal values that might undermine such 
regimes (democracy, human rights, and the rule of law).  The EU spectacularly failed 
this challenge with the Arab Spring (through the 'Partnership for Democracy and 
Shared Prosperity'xxxiii) and faced it again after the attempted coup in Turkey because 
the EU, despite the reduced attention to democracy in the EUGS relative to the ESS, 
still finds it difficult to balance working with authoritarian regimes against its other 
values, which in turn undermines its credibility in supporting or, even more difficult, 
protecting indigenous democratic reform movements. 
 Similarly, the EUGS notes the emergence of Russia as a 'key strategic 
challenge', but then simply reiterates the current confusion facing the EU: it 'will not 
recognise Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea nor accept the destabilisation of 
Ukraine', yet offers to cooperate with Russia 'if and when our interests overlap.'xxxiv  
In other words, nothing in the EUGS suggests that the EU, by itself, could compel 
Russia, under its present leadership, to retreat from Ukraine, or deter Russia from 
 10 
destabilising other countries within its sphere of influence.  As the EU also cannot 
'outbid' Russia on its own flanks, partly because the EU cannot make credible 
promises compared to Russian ones (or deter Russian threats), the EU can hope only 
to support the efforts of NATO in responding to the key Russian 'challenge': 
reassuring NATO members most at risk from Russian encroachments, as affirmed at 
the 2016 Warsaw Summit.  This also means the EU must qualify its ambitions among 
its eastern neighbours to avoid encouraging, or even requiring, them to choose 
between EU trade pacts or Russian ones. 
 Finally, the EUGS goal of an 'integrated approach' to conflicts and crisesxxxv 
echoes the discussion of resilience above with more attention to failed states and 
human security; it also attempts to go beyond the so-called 'comprehensive approach' 
(i.e., using a full range of EU policy tools to address various aspects of a specific 
conflict/crisis) with a 'multi-dimensional, multi-phased, multi-level, and multi-lateral' 
approach.  Various sub-sections here on 'pre-emptive peace', 'security and 
stabilisation', 'conflict settlement', and 'political economy of peace' bring in even more 
'root causes' to deal with (i.e., human rights violations, development, resource stress, 
gender imbalances, etc.).  If strategy is supposed to be about priorities, then these 
sections of the EUGS leave much to be desired in terms of how the EU should 
respond to a particular crisis, which would involve short-term and medium/long-term 
capabilities.  Even worse perhaps is that while the 2003 ESS specifically noted that 
'Resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict was a strategic priority for Europe,'xxxvi the 
EUGS does not give this or any conflict the strategic priority it had in 2003; in fact, if 
a single neighbourhood issue deserves such a status in the EUGS, it is most certainly 
the problem of Syria (including Islamic State). 
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III. The credibility deficit 
 Leaving aside the problems above, while maintaining a strategic focus on the 
neighbourhood, how does the EU expect to convert its EUGS into policy action?  To 
deal with this challenge, the EUGS itself concludes with a brief overview of this issue 
in hopes of becoming a more 'common, comprehensive, and consistent' global 
actor,xxxvii as the EUGS Review had anticipated.  This involves networks, economic 
weight, and the full range of soft and hard EU policy tools to act in a 'coherent and 
coordinated way' - the mantra of EU foreign/security policy cooperation for decades 
and now framed largely as the 'comprehensive approach'.xxxviii  Specifically, the 
EUGS will be implemented according to these parameters: 
 A 'credible Union': According to the EUGS, the EU's credibility hinges on its 
unity, past achievements, power of attraction, effective and consistent policies, and 
adherence to values.xxxix  Previous work on 'credible commitments' also suggests that 
the EU has clear potential as a strategic partner based on its democratic foundations 
and internal decision-making processes that may make it difficult to renege on agreed 
policies.xl  However, if the EU's credibility really hinges upon its past achievements, 
effective policies, and adherence to values, then this claim simply cannot be 
supported in terms of coping with the main challenge noted above: the 'arc of 
instability' surrounding the EU.xli  This concern goes well back to the 1970s, and the 
EU consistently has failed to address it through a range of policy measures (Euro-
Arab Dialogue, Middle East Peace Process, Euro-Med Programme, ENP, Eastern 
Partnership, Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity, etc).  Relying on such 
archaic thinking (i.e., the 'power of attraction' and the ENP) to cope with the single 
most serious external security problem facing the EU today - various crises generated 
by state weakness/failure on the EU's flanks - is a major deficiency of the EUGS.  In 
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other words, if the ENP approach did not work before the 2011 Arab Spring, the 
violent collapse of Syria, and the rise of Islamic State, not to mention Russian 
intervention in two ENP partners (Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014), then why 
should such an approach work now?  Worse, as noted above enlargement has reached 
its practical limits as a major foreign policy tool outside of the Balkans, so the EU 
must rely on its ability to project economic and, possibly, limited military/police 
power.  Although the EU has been effective in using force to deal with one major 
security threat - piracy and state weakness around the Horn of Africaxlii - it has failed 
conspicuously to do so closer to home in the MENA and the east. 
 A 'responsive Union': The EUGS calls for the EU 'to respond more rapidly and 
flexibly' to foreign challenges, highlighting the role of the Lisbon Treaty but also 
noting the possibility of coalitions of the willing to act under EU authority.xliii  This 
option has been permitted in EU treaties since the 1990s, and was reiterated in the 
Lisbon Treaty,xliv yet the EU has never managed to act in this manner under the EU's 
formal rules.  Moreover, the fact that the EUGS basically expects that some EU 
member states will act on their own, in a way that has eluded the EU for years, hardly 
inspires confidence.  The EUGS also rightly notes the continued inability to deploy 
EU Battlegroups in the service of such operations under the CSDP.  Again, the EU's 
track record in these areas, beyond the Battlegroups failure, is quite limited in terms 
of launching CSDP peacekeeping/conflict resolution operations, generating military 
or civilian forces, providing logistical/intelligence support, and so on.  Nor has the EU 
made much use of the CSFP/CSDP more generally in terms of dealing with instability 
on its eastern and southern flanks; the most extensive CSDP activity has taken place 
in the Balkans (essentially taking over previous UN and NATO deployments) and 
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central Africa, which is hardly a strategic priority for the EU relative to its border 
areas and the Mediterranean. 
 Civilian capabilities are mentioned as well here, as a 'trademark' of the CSDP, 
and the EUGS notes a need to broaden the EU's more general 'knowledge base' 
regarding its global activities,xlv yet again the document does not set down any 
specific goals or targets or timelines in these realms, except perhaps the related goal 
to achieve the target of 0.7% of Gross National Income spending on Official 
Development Assistance (which is of course an indirect, long-term policy tool rather 
than a short-term crisis response mechanism).  Instead, as elsewhere throughout the 
document, the EUGS speaks in generalities: cooperating, strengthening, encouraging, 
streamlining, enhancing, investing, and so on (i.e., 'investing in the EU Conflict and 
Early Warning System').  Most CSDP actions in fact have fallen short of their staffing 
and/or material requirements,xlvi which are provided largely by EU member states, so 
the EU's autonomy or credibility cannot possibly be enhanced unless the EU 
addresses this problem explicitly, forcefully, and permanently. 
 A 'joined-up Union': Finally, the EUGS notes the need to make the EU more 
coherent in global affairs by 'joining-up' its various institutions and capabilities,xlvii as 
with the 'innovation' of the EU's comprehensive approach to security.  However, the 
EUGS fails to recognise that the comprehensive approach, mainly involving the 
security-development nexus, is far more rhetoric than reality, meaning that EU 
civilian and military/police deployments maintain a clear division of responsibility 
and separate command structures between these realms.  Among over 30 CSDP 
actions since 2003, for example, only the EUNAVFOR Somalia counter-piracy naval 
operation can be offered as a possible example of the comprehensive approach in 
action; even worse, unfortunately, is that this is also a major CSDP operation where 
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the UK - which is now preparing to leave the EU - played a strategically important 
role given its naval capabilities.xlviii  Even in this case, however, the various civilian-
military activities pursued under EUNAVFOR Somalia, including two follow-on 
capacity-building missions (EUCAP Nestor and EUTM Somalia), were planned 
separately and are conducted under different chains of command.  Finally, as most of 
the EU's neighbourhood involves developing states, the Commission must be seen as 
a major player in the region, yet it is consistently marginalised when the EU takes 
'high politics' actions under the CFSP/CSDP. 
 In other words, despite a decade of discussion about the EU's comprehensive 
approach, the EUGS does not outline a model for a single 'joined-up' approach to 'civ-
mil' capabilities, involving unified planning, an integrated command structure, and 
standing resources.  Nor does it mention at all any plan to address the respective 
division of labour between the military/police elements of the European External 
Action Service (EEAS), the EU Military Staff (EUMS), and civilian-focused 
Commission responsibilities (i.e., the security-development nexus, including 
humanitarian aid and disaster response) that would need to be re-thought to 
implement the EUGS as hoped.  Instead, the EUGS merely takes as a given the 
complicated division of labour between the Commission and the EEAS/EUMS 
regarding internal/external action, which effectively prevents more responsive 'joined 
up' EU action rather than facilitates it.xlix  This is one of the most important missed 
opportunities in the entire document, especially considering not just the need for a 
true comprehensive approach in EU external civilian-military actions but also the 
clear erosion of boundaries between external and internal security and the pursuit of 
the EU's Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice more generally (or the new 'Security 
Union').  Again, the EUGS touches upon this point,l but only in terms of generalities 
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(i.e., better coordination) and by taking the EU's complicated and even redundant 
structures for granted rather than attempting to streamline or re-focus them. 
 Thus, to implement the EUGS properly, and assuming territorial defence is 
left to NATO, the EU still needs to link its security interests to its socio-economic 
interests, whether in the form of a strategic culture, strategic concept, or 'Security 
Union,' to quickly deploy a full range of EU policy tools and resources - from civilian 
to military - through EU institutions and EU member states.  There are some signs 
that this is happening,li yet this effort still does not go far enough in terms of not just 
the provision of adequate material resources (military and otherwise), but also robust 
and accountable procedures for deploying multilateral civ-mil forces rapidly, 
overseeing them, and coordinating their use with other EU policy tools.  Around the 
EU itself, this would involve: 1) conditional reassurance for relatively stable MENA 
states (Algeria, Jordan, Israel/Palestine, Lebanon, Tunisia, Morocco); 2) pragmatic or 
selective engagement, in close partnership with others (perhaps as an 'honest broker' 
offering major post-conflict assistance and refugee support), with more difficult cases 
(Egypt, Libya, Syria); and 3) a junior or 'civilian partner' role to NATO with 
neighbouring states to the east (Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine) and perhaps the southern 
Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia), if only temporarily.  The EU also will need 
to calibrate its policies towards these states very carefully and flexibly, which mainly 
involves the use of soft power tools, and possibly light military/police forces, as the 
EU's track record clearly shows that it has very little will for 'hard' military 
peacekeeping operations.lii  This reluctance to deploy heavy military force on the 
ground would become even more pronounced if an EU operation ever resulted in 
mass casualties.  Instead, for now the EU may have to support unilateral military 
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actions by its own member states to secure its neighbourhood, as with France's 
intervention in Mali.liii 
 
Conclusion 
 The EUGS has been praised for its ambitiousness, its idealism, and its 
boldness, not least by former EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana (among others).liv  
However, idealistic ambitions also have a price for political actors when they fail to 
live up to their ideals, or deliberately violate them through action or inaction; such 
actors lose credibility/legitimacy at best and can be accused of hypocrisy at worst.  
This is especially problematic in democratic polities or international organisations 
pursuing normative or 'aspirational' goals.lv  The EUGS clearly represents some of the 
EU's idealist tendencies, yet those ambitions must be balanced against a pragmatic 
and honest assessment of what the EU realistically can achieve in the face of so many 
internal and external challenges, especially as the EU already can be accused of 
hypocrisy, or at least gross insensitivity, in a number of ways: human rights in China 
and the former Soviet Union, the recent visa deal with Turkey, refugees drowning in 
the Mediterranean, refugee camps and border walls in Europe, austerity in Greece, 
arms sales to Africa, etc.  Moreover, two potential sources of EU power - the soft 
power of enlargement and the hard power of offensive military force (including air 
strikes) - simply are not credible in much of the neighbourhood, while the EU's 
maritime security capabilities will diminish if the British Navy does not participate in 
the CSDP, so the EU must rely on other tools for the foreseeable future. 
 In this light, and considering the wide scope of the EUGS, much of which may 
amount to wishful thinking, it is important to remind ourselves about the central 
raison d'etre of European integration: fundamentally, the EU is about peaceful 
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conflict resolution among its own member states across a wide range of issue-areas 
(or the management of complex interdependencelvi), a process which generally 
favours slow, but hopefully more stable, consensus-building.  Consensus is especially 
prized by the EU in the realm of foreign/security policy, where the stakes and risks 
can be much higher than with internal socio-economic policy.  This tendency is also 
why the EU does not respond very credibly during crisis situations, as consensus 
(internal conflict resolution) is favoured over effectiveness (decisive external action).  
Although the EUGS aims for the ambition of 'strategic autonomy' for the EU, based 
on its 'credibility', the EU's own foreign/security policy system simply is not equipped 
to achieve this core aim, whether in terms of formal institutions or standing 
capabilities. 
 In short, without greater harmonisation of national approaches to security and 
defence, and/or a stronger bureaucratic 'core' to act as a policy entrepreneur in terms 
of planning and conducting joint actions in a consistent fashion, it is still too easy for 
internal events and the varied interests of EU member states to delay, or even prevent, 
coordinated action when a foreign crisis hits.  The Brexit issue alone, for example, is 
likely to preoccupy the EU for the next half-decade or more, just as the Lisbon Treaty 
did.  Of course, if the EU just wanted to protect itself while pursing what largely 
amounts to international social work (development/humanitarian aid), then it should 
adopt a 'fortress Europe' approach and continue to build walls, physical and otherwise, 
against foreign threats.  However, if the EU really wants to shape the world in its own 
image, and not 'pull up a drawbridge,'lvii because its strategic goals include the liberal 
virtues of economic openness, equality, democracy, human rights, diversity, and the 
rule of law, then it must work much harder to secure these values within and around 
Europe itself.  This ongoing effort should be closely coordinated especially on the 
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EU's bordering regions to help, at the very least, reinforce what will always be the 
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